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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although granted to an inventor or group of inventors, patents be-
stow benefits on at least two separate groups. The inventor or his as-
signee1 benefits from the reward of the limited monopoly conferred by 
a patent, allowing him to exclude others from making, using, or sell-
ing a product or process that is covered by the patent. Society, the 
second beneficiary, profits from the public disclosure of new technol-
ogy-a disclosure which advances scientific progress and serves to 
define boundaries around which competitors must design. While the 
benefit afforded to society seems readily apparent, the extent to 
• Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am grateful 
for the helpful comments of Graeme Dinwoodie and Tim Holbrook in preparing this Arti-
cle. 
1. Throughout this Article, the terms "inventor," "applicant," and "patentee" are 
used interchangeably to describe the owner of the patent. Although the United States pat-
ent system requires that a patent application shall be filed in the names of the inventors, 
35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(l) (2000) ("An application for patent shall be made ... by the inven-
tor."), the vast majority of patents are assigned to another party, usually a company or or-
ganization. See PATENT TECH MONITORING DIV., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PTMD SPECIAL REPORT: ALL PATENTS, ALL TYPES pt. A1 (2004), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/officesfar/ido/oeip'tafi'apat.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) (indicat-
ing that eighty percent of the patents granted between 1977 and 2001 were assigned to ei-
ther U.S. or foreign corporations). It should be understood that, but for parts discussing 
the patent application process itself, the above terms include assignees, where the patent 
has already been assigned. 
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which the patentee actually benefits, at least under a traditional 
view of patent law, may be greatly exaggerated. 
Regardless of whether the patentee is seeking to reap the tradi-
tional patent reward, any real or perceived benefits to the patentee 
and society are burdened by ever-growing problems at the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office). Leading this list 
of problems is the increase in issuance of "bad" patents,2 or patents 
that do not meet the requirements for patentability. This problem 
has not only generated commentary by legal scholars3 but has also 
attracted the attention of the general public4 and has even become 
the subject of a recent book, Innovation and Its Discontents. 5 
A second problem-the lack of speed with which patent applica-
tions traverse the patent grant system-has not generated much 
commentary, possibly due to the opacity of the patent grant system 
to outsiders. Despite efforts of the Patent Office to grant patents in a 
timely fashion, the issuance process can stretch a number of years, 
especially in certain technology areas. 6 This poses a problem for the 
patentee, in that he is unable to enforce his patent rights during the 
time between filing of the application and issuance of the patent and 
may not be able to derive any benefit from the invention during that 
time. Society also suffers from the uncertainty of not knowing the 
2. The term "bad" patent should not implicate any moral or ethical judgment on the 
subject matter claimed; rather, a "bad" patent is one that should not have been granted by 
the Patent Office after a reasonable examination in view of the most relevant prior art. See 
Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
763, 766 n.6 (2002). 
3. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of 
Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1219, 1227-36 (2004); Mark A 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2001); 
Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); Joseph 
Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 668-70 (2004); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action 
in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 316-22 
(2001). 
4. See, e.g., Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce: Patent Absurdity, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 
1999, at C4 (criticizing "soft" patents, which "often lay claim to some of the most mundane 
activities of daily life," such as U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 which discloses the idea of using 
an illustrated book to teach janitors how to clean a building); Paul Davidson, Patents Out 
ofControl?, USA TODAY, Jan. 13,2004, at 1B; James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 2000, (Magazine), at 44; David Ignatius, Op-Ed., Firestorm in Cyberspace, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at B07. 
5. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004). Adam 
B. Jaffe is a professor of economics at Brandeis University, and Josh Lerner is a professor 
of investment banking at Harvard Business School. Interestingly, the publication of this 
book has generated mainstream media coverage, further publicizing the problem of bad 
patents. See, e.g., Sabra Chartrand, Does the Patent System Need an Overhaul?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at CS (discussing the Jaffe and Lerner book as criticizing the patent 
system, including the issuance of bad patents). 
6. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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true scope of the patented invention until the patent issues. It is easy 
to see the conflict between the two problems, speed and quality, and 
how a solution that may improve one metric is likely to negatively af-
fect the other. 
To examine more fully both the speed and quality problems identi-
fied above, the patent grant system, that is, the path a patent appli-
cation follows from the time it is filed until it matures into an issued 
patent, can be analogized to a busy highway. Patent applications en-
ter this highway through a limited number of "on-ramps" and then 
race, stutter, stop, and start all along a single route.7 Applications 
continue down the path until exiting the highway, when either the 
applicant abandons the application or the patent is issued by the 
Patent Office.8 The root of the speed and quality problems is that the 
highway is simply overcrowded. 
The pragmatic answer to an overcrowded highway is often to build 
more roads. This Article proposes implementing a multitier patent 
system by the creation of two additional "roads" or routes that a pat-
ent application may follow. Because many patents are not sought 
with the intention of pursuing the traditional patent reward of com-
mercialization or profit through access control, that is, the exercise of 
the limited patent monopoly, there is no reason for every single ap-
plication to follow the current route. The creation of an auxiliary, or 
"side road," would decrease crowding on the current patent grant 
highway while still allowing the nontraditional applications to enter 
and traverse the patent grant system with different points of access. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are patent applications that 
would derive more benefit through expediency in the patent grant 
system. For those applications, this Article proposes the creation of 
express lanes through the patent grant system. These two additional 
routes, used in conjunction with the current patent grant highway, 
would arguably decrease crowding, thus allowing for quicker patent 
grants as well as more careful analysis by the Patent Office and 
fewer bad patents. Because the proposed system considers the appli-
7. To take this analogy further, it is easy to conceptualize each technology area, or 
even each art unit, as a "lane" on the patent grant highway, thus simulating the backlogs 
created in "hot" technology areas. 
8. While this description is sufficient for the discussion to follow, it is not entirely ac-
curate due to continuation practice. In keeping with the highway metaphor, the Patent Of-
fice may, by issuing a "Final Rejection," claim that an application should not be on the 
highway because it is unpatentable. However, the term "Final" is a misnomer because the 
applicant can file a continuation application, which permits the application to essentially 
reenter the highway at the same point that it had exited to have another chance to obtain 
a patent. For a detailed discussion of continuation practice and its drawbacks to the patent 
grant system, see Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Con-
tinuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004). 
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cant's intended use for the patent,9 whether for the traditional patent 
reward of exclusion or otherwise, the patent grant highway is further 
modified to address the unique needs ofthe applications. These addi-
tional modifications may further decrease the traffic congestion. The 
expected outcome of the implementation of this proposed multitier 
patent grant system would be improved quality of issued patents as 
well as decreased time from application filing to patent grant. 
Part II of this Article discusses the notion of nontraditional patent 
usage by considering the inventor's intent as well as externalities, 
such as market realities, that shape how a patent will be used. It also 
elaborates on the problems of patent quality and speed of issuance 
alluded to above. Part III then presents a model for categorizing pat-
ent applications into three types, based on inventor intent and mar-
ket realities as understood at the time the application is filed. Part 
III also identifies the peculiar requirements of each of the three pro-
posed categories of patent applications, considers how the current 
patent grant system fails to meet these needs, and further, analyzes 
how these failures affect the speed and quality metrics of the current 
patent grant system. Part IV proposes a multitier patent system that 
uniquely addresses each application type described in Part III and 
discusses how such a multitier system meets the unique needs of 
each application type as well as leads to overall improvement in pat-
ent quality and speed of issuance. Finally, Part V reviews and com-
pares multitier patent systems in existence internationally as well as 
proposals for multitier patent systems raised by commentators. It 
further answers why the multitiered patent system proposed in this 
Article does not suffer the same criticisms as have been proffered for 
other multitiered patent systems. 
II. CONGESTION ON THE PATENT GRANT HIGHWAY 
A. The Traditional Patent Benefit 
The classic view of the patent reward is that an inventor's benefit 
flows from the grant of a limited monopoly, allowing the inventor to 
commercialize the invention and profit either by exerting the right to 
exclude others from making, using, importing, offering to sell, or sell-
ing the same or by otherwise controlling access to the invention 
9. It is true that an applicant, at the time of filing, may not have a concrete, in-
tended use for the patent or that the applicant's intended use will not be possible for a va-
riety of reasons once the patent issues. However, especially in the case of nontraditional 
patent usage, the applicant is likely to have sufficient information to make at least a pri-
mary guess at the intended usage. How the applicant initially intended to use the patent, 
how it may be uncertain, and how it may change over time is discussed in more detail. See 
discussion infra Part II.A 
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through licensing.10 Assuming that patent infringement litigation 
provides a viable indicator that a patentee is exercising this exclu-
sion right, the classic view becomes less than convincing. Studies in-
dicate that only two percent of issued patents are ever litigated.11 If 
the number of patents licensed for royalties is also included in that 
statistic, thereby encompassing the right of the inventor to profit by 
controlling access to the invention, the figure raises slightly to an es-
timated five percent.12 That such a small percentage of patents is 
"used" in what is considered a traditional sense raises some ques-
tions. 
There are certainly explanations for this lower-than-expected us-
age of patents in litigation and licensing that preserve the classic 
view of the patentee's reward. One possible, but highly unlikely, ex-
planation for the low percentage of patents being litigated or licensed 
is that every patent so perfectly defines the boundaries of an inven-
tion that no other party would trespass, either intentionally or inad-
vertently, and any potential competitor is able to completely design 
around the well-defined boundaries. Another more likely explanation 
may be that the outcome of patent infringement litigation is so un-
certain that any risk-averse entity will avoid litigation if possibleP 
Aversion to litigation, however, could logically lead to a greater num-
ber of licenses having been taken than has been estimated.14 
Despite this evidence that patents are not always used to obtain 
the traditional patentee's reward, there is no indication that patents 
10. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1500-01 ("The traditional incentive story relied upon by 
intellectual property scholars assumes that people seek patents to obtain exclusive rights 
to a technology, and that they use those patents either to exclude competitors from the 
market or to obtain licensing revenue in exchange for permitting the use of the patented 
technology."). 
11. Id. at 1501. 
12. See id. at 1507 (estimating that "the total number of patents litigated or licensed 
for a royalty (as opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued pat-
ents"). Lemley, however, acknowledges that there is controversy over this figure. See id. at 
1507 n.53. Because licenses are not required to be recorded, it is difficult to know precisely 
how many patents are licensed. 
13. See, e.g., Mark A Lemley, The Ecorwmics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1071 (1997) ("Absent asymmetry [between the parties' posi-
tions], litigation uncertainty is at least as likely to encourage a licensing transaction (for 
example, where both parties are risk averse) as it is to discourage one."); Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Ecorwmic Perspectives on Inrwvation, 76 CAL. 
L. REV. 805, 868 (1988) (noting that "[f]irms frequently agree to settlements because of the 
uncertainty that accompanies a patent infringement suit" and that patent litigation pre-
sents a "wide range of possible outcomes at several stages, including the initial decisions 
on patentability and infringement and determination of damages"). 
14. Risk aversion could, conceivably, lead instead to an abandonment of a given prod-
uct or process, which would not result in an increase in licensing rates. The loss of money 
invested in pursuing a particular product or process, however, makes abandonment of that 
product or process at least as likely as licensing. 
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are being sought less frequently; in fact, the contrary is true. 15 Per-
haps a better explanation for the phenomenon of less-than-expected 
litigation and licensing rates is that the intent of an inventor upon 
filing a patent application may be something other than to exercise 
the traditional benefits of commercialization and exclusion or limited 
access. The inventor's intended use of the patent may not hinge on 
exclusion at all. That is, an inventor may be seeking a patent with no 
intention of capitalizing on the limited monopoly, either through pro-
duction and exclusion or through licensing for royalties. 
Legal scholars have raised a number of reasons why an inventor 
may seek a patent other than to benefit from the traditional patent 
reward. Some of these reasons are tangentially related to exclusion 
or limited access. For example, Professor Ann Bartow has noted that 
an inventor may intend to use the patent to obtain some other busi-
ness advantage, such as cross-licensing, defensive patenting, and 
leveraging against a competitor for legitimate or harassment pur-
poses.16 Other reasons, however, are wholly unrelated to the litiga-
tion and licensing paradigm associated with the classic view of the 
patentee's benefit. Professor Clarisa Long has written on the phe-
nomenon of patents being used as a means to communicate informa-
tion, for example, to enhance the image of the patent holder as a 
market leader or as a technologically and innovatively proficient en-
tity.17 Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner have 
concluded that patents individually are often not useful and have 
suggested that patents should instead be obtained to create a patent 
portfolio, or "a strategic collection of distinct-but-related individual 
patents that, when combined, confer an array of important advan-
tages upon the portfolio holder."18 Professor Mark Lemley has indi-
15. See U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'r OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, 2, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/annual/2004'060402_table2.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 2004 
PrO ANNuAL REPORT] (listing the total number of utility applications filed each calendar 
year-for example, in 1984, 109,010 applications were filed; in 1990, 162,708 applications; 
in 2000, 291,653 applications; and in 2004, 351,431 applications). 
16. See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing lnTUJvation from Actual Invention: A Pro-
posal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 2 (2000); see also Lemley, supra note 3, at 1504-05. 
17. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 627-28 (2002) ("If an 
easily measurable firm attribute such as patent counts is positively correlated with other 
less readily measurable firm attributes such as knowledge capital, then patent counts can 
be used as a means of conveying information about these other attributes. Knowing this, 
firms may choose to obtain and use a portfolio of patent rights to signal information about 
themselves that would be more expensive to convey through other means."); see also Bar-
tow, supra note 16, at 2-3; Lemley, supra note 3, at 1505-06. 
18. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios 27 (U. of Pa. Law 
School, Public Working Law, Working Paper 56; U. ofPa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research 
Paper 04-16), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=582201. The patent portfolio theory 
may also explain the lower-than-expected rate oflitigation. In a patent portfolio, a number 
of related patents are obtained to cover an invention, each having a different claim scope. 
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cated that patents may be sought to obtain rewards through inven-
tion incentive programs offered by an inventor's employer.19 Finally, 
Professor Bartow has claimed that some patents are obtained simply 
because the applicant desires to have a patent issued in his or her 
name.20 
Regardless of the inventor's intent upon filing a patent applica-
tion, externalities such as market conditions facing the inventor also 
affect the patent's use. Even an application filed with the intent of 
using the patent for licensing or litigation purposes may result in is-
sued claims that are too narrow to be actively or usefully licensed or 
litigated. Alternatively, a patent intended for litigation or licensing 
may fall victim to an industry that was headed in one direction at the 
time the application was filed, but which moved in a different direc-
tion by the time the patent issues, again precluding active licensing 
or litigation. One indicator that patentees are not receiving the 
hoped-for value from their patents is the fact that a large number of 
issued patents lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees. 21 In fact, 
nearly half of all patents are abandoned for failure to pay mainte-
nance fees before the patent term is half over, and two-thirds of all 
patents lapse in this way before the end of their term. 22 Thus, a com-
prehensive explanation for the low percentage of patents involved in 
litigation and licensing may be that many applications are filed with 
the intent that these patents will be used for some other purpose, 
and of the remaining applications filed with the traditional intent, 
many of these patents fail to meet the applicant's expectations upon 
filing. 
When enforcing the exclusion right, then, somewhat less than the whole portfolio may be 
asserted thus resulting in a lowered percentage of existent patents being litigated. It is un-
clear, however, the effect that patent portfolios would have on the percentage of patents li-
censed. 
19. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1506. On a related note, Parchomovsky and Wagner, 
supra note 18, at 22, discuss the use of patents as a measure of internal firm metrics, such 
as determining employee productivity. 
20. See Bartow, supra note 16, at 3 ("At first blush, it appears that inventors obtain 
these patents simply because they can."). This desire to obtain a patent may be tied to the 
Hegelian view of property in that property is an integral part of human personality. See 
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor 
After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1324 n.46 (2004). 
21. Maintenance fees, in annually adjusted increasing amounts, are due at periods of 
3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years after the patent issues to keep it in force. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 41(b) (2000). The figures for 2005 are $900, $2300, and $3800, respectively. US. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FY 2005 FEE SCHEDULE, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/fees/index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2005). 
22. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1503. While this statistic is indicative that perhaps 
patents do not fulfill the expectations of the patentee upon filing, thus proving to be un-
worthy of additional costs in the form of maintenance fees, this figure may also show that 
many inventions become obsolete well before the expiration of the patent. 
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B. The Problem of Bad Patents 
Under the traditional view of the patentee's reward-that is, the 
right to commercialize and exclude or control access-it is imperative 
that the patent grant process inspires confidence.23 The public has to 
believe that the patent was not only providently granted but also 
that the granted patent clearly defines the boundaries of exclusion. 
To have such confidence in granted patents, the public has to believe 
that the patent application received the appropriate scrutiny by the 
Patent Office before the patent was issued. As noted above, however, 
criticisms that the Patent Office is not carefully scrutinizing patent 
applications are being raised from both inside and outside the legal 
community.24 If the public is skeptical about the quality of issued 
patents, it is difficult for the patentee to then reap the traditional 
patentee's reward and enforce his exclusionary rights. 
In addition to decreasing the credibility of the patent system, bad 
patents impose further negative costs on society. For example, bad 
patents permit the patentee to engage in opportunistic licensing 
schemes, forcing a rational licensee to settle for a license on a patent 
that should not have been granted instead of resorting to litigation to 
have that patent invalidated.25 Where a bad patent is granted and 
the patentee exercises his exclusionary rights, society must bear any 
supracompetitive pricing that results from the absence of noninfring-
ing product substitutes. 26 Additional monetary costs include the filing 
and prosecution expenses of obtaining the bad patent and the subse-
quent costs of having the courts fix the Patent Office's mistakes, for 
example, by declaring a bad patent invalid.27 Other costs include 
chilling of downstream innovation and encouraging wasteful design-
around activity by competitors who fear infringement.28 Compound-
ing these concerns is the difficulty of determining ex ante whether a 
patent is bad. Further, the concept of bad patents may not exist as a 
dichotomy; rather, there is likely a spectrum of patent quality, rang-
ing from those having very little doubt about validity to those inven-
tions that should have been, at least, obviously not patentable. Many 
of these costs are borne by society even in the case of validly issued 
patents; however, in those cases, the public receives the often coun-
teracting benefit from the public disclosure of new technology. In 
23. At least one commentator has opined that, because a majority of patents are used 
for purposes other than litigation or licensing, perhaps their validity need not require such 
a stringent review. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1514-15. This idea will be explored more 
fully below. See infra Part II.A. 
24. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
25. See Kesan, supra note 2, at 767. 
26. See id. at 767-68. 
27. See id. at 768. 
28. See id. at 767; Lemley, supra note 3, at 1516. 
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many cases, the negative costs prove more severe under the classic 
view of the patentee's reward, where the patentee can extract a 
higher fee due to supracompetitive pricing or where the patentee can 
exploit the financial sensibilities of a rational and risk-averse licen-
see. Where the patentee is not seeking to commercialize and exclude 
or otherwise control access to the invention, these negative costs are 
not implicated. 
C. The Problem of Slow Issuance 
Although it may not receive the same amount of (or any, for that 
matter) mainstream press as the problem of bad patents, the length 
of time the Patent Office takes to examine and issue a patent pre-
sents a problem of the same magnitude, or even greater, to a pat-
entee. The dilemma stems from a period of dead time for the pat-
entee and, moreover, is implicated under both the traditional view of 
patent benefits and nontraditional patent usage. A patent remains in 
force for twenty years from the date an application is filed;29 however, 
a patent is only enforceable from the date it issues.30 Thus, the period 
between the date an application is filed and the date the patent ulti-
mately issues is essentially a dead period for the patentee, regardless 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (A patent grant "shall be for a term beginning on the 
date on which the application issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the appli-
cation for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a specific 
reference to an earlier filed application or applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of 
this title, from the date on which the earliest such application was filed."). 
The AIPA purports to create a seventeen-year patent term guarantee by providing ad-
ditional reasons for patent term extensions, i.e., adding time to the twenty-year expiration 
date if certain conditions are met, for patent applications filed on or after May 29, 2000. 
Patent term extensions are available if the Patent Office fails to meet a statutory deadline, 
if the patent does not issue within three years of filing, or if the patent grant is delayed 
due to interferences, secrecy orders, or successful appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences. !d. § 154(b)(1). The period of adjustment will be reduced, however, if the 
applicant "fail[s) to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude processing or examination of 
an application," for example, by taking longer than three months to respond to a notice 
from the Patent Office. ld. § 154(b)(2). 
30. The exception is the implementation of provisional rights, which became available 
with the publication of patent applications at eighteen months post-filing, and was imple-
mented by the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA). Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 
1501 A-552 (1999). "[A) patent shall include the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from 
any person who [infringes the invention as claimed in the published patent application), 
during the period beginning on the date of publication of the application ... and ending on 
the date the patent is issued." 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(l). However, provisional rights are not 
available "unless the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially identical to the in-
vention as claimed in the published patent application." ld. § 154(d)(2). Given that few 
patents issue with claims in "substantially identical" form to the claims as originally filed, 
it is unclear whether provisional rights will be an adequate remedy. As of March 2005, the 
courts have not yet had opportunity to interpret "substantially identical" or the scope of 
the provisional rights provision. 
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of the invention's intended usage. An extended dead period shortens 
the available "live" period for the patent.31 
This dead period imposes costs on both beneficiaries of the patent 
system. While applicants who intend to commercialize and capitalize 
on the limited monopoly may make and use the invention them-
selves, they must wait until the patent issues to litigate. Applicants 
hoping to exploit the invention commercially without practicing the 
invention themselves may sell or license the technology even before a 
patent is issued; however, the uncertainty of the claim scope of the 
future patent as well as its remaining term of enforcement may 
negatively affect the negotiated rate to the applicant's detriment.32 
Even with nontraditional uses of patents, it is possible that the pat-
entee may need to wait until the patent issues before using it for 
whatever intended purpose-it is unclear how much leverage or sig-
naling can be gained from a patent application for the same reasons 
of uncertainty in scope and remaining term. The costs to society of a 
not-yet-issued patent, particularly one that resulted in a published 
application, are not unlike those costs imposed by a bad patent, be-
cause the claimed subject matter of issued patents is rarely identical 
to that of the applications as originally filed. While society does bene-
fit from the disclosure of the technology via the publication of patent 
applications, the boundaries defined through published applications 
for not-yet-granted patents are fuzzy at best. Presumably, societal 
costs would not be implicated in the case of an unpublished patent 
application, because society would not be on notice of any overly 
broad, originally filed application; however, society is not free to ig-
nore the claimed subject matter of a published, but not-yet-issued, 
patent application because it is often a toss up as to what, if any, 
31. Although the twenty-year patent term was adopted to curb a problem with sub-
marine patents, an issue at the other end of the spectrum from the problems discussed in 
this Article, the implementation of the twenty-year patent term was based on the idea that 
patents would issue in three years or less. However, the boom in patent applications has 
made this timeline somewhat idealistic, as patents usually issue with less than a seven-
teen-year live period, which harms the patentee. 
32. See, e.g., U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEn OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 20, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offi.ces/com/annual/2002/index.html (last visited May 22, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2002 PTO ANNuAL REPORT] (stating that the twenty-year patent term, coupled 
with lengthy pendency of applications "complicate[s] business decisions and negatively im-
pact[s] a patent owner's ability to collect royalties, raise capital, and bring new products to 
market particularly in computer-related fields where the product cycle is relatively short"); 
see also, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. H1373 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep. Rohra-
bacher) (advocating for the guaranteed seventeen-year patent term, "however, 20 years, all 
it really means is the clock is ticking against the inventor. If it takes 10 to 15 years to get 
an invention patented, for the patent to issue, that patent applicant basically has lost all of 
that time."); Anneliese M. Seifert, Comment, Will the United States Take the Plunge into 
Global Patent Law Harrrwnization? A Discussion of the United States' Past, Present, and 
Future Harmonization Efforts, 6 MARQ.INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 173, 186 (2002). 
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elements of the claims are narrowed in prosecution and to what ex-
tent. Historically, the scope of the claims of issued patents was often 
significantly narrower than the applications as originally filed. That 
trend may now be reversing such that patentees are initially filing 
narrow claims which are subsequently broadened, in part due to the 
recent Festo decision33 and in part due to strategic maneuvering in 
light of published applications.34 Regardless, due to the give-and-take 
between examiner and applicant during the patent application proc-
ess, it is likely that the issued claims will be different in some respect 
from the claims as filed. 
Although the Patent Office has claimed that the average pend-
ency, or interval between filing of an application and issuance of the 
corresponding patent, is approximately twenty-four months,35 this 
figure is misleading, in part due to a much-criticized method of crea-
tive accounting of patent applications by the Patent Office.36 Further, 
being an average, this figure necessarily fails to take into account 
33. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002). 
Under Festa and Federal Circuit progeny thereof, narrowing amendments and cancellation 
of broad claims in favor of narrower claims precludes the resort to the doctrine of equiva-
lents in later litigation due to prosecution history estoppel. 
34. The publication of applications may create an incentive to file narrower claims 
which are then broadened during prosecution of the patent application in order to keep 
competitors at a disadvantage for a longer period of time. 
35. See 2002 PTO ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 15. This twenty-four-month fig-
ure actually includes any disposal of a patent application, either via issuance or abandon-
ment. See also 2004 PTO ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 4, tbl.4, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ofti.ces/com/annual/2004/060404_table4.html (last visited Oct. 7, 
2005). 
I d. 
36. The criticism comes from the Patent Office's use of the most recent continuation 
date in calculating its average pendency. For example, if a patent application was origi-
nally filed in 1996, two continuations of the application were filed in 1998 and 2000, and 
the patent ultimately issues in 2002, the Patent Office statistics would count this as three 
separate applications, each with a two-year pendency. See, e.g., Donald W. Banner, Is 
There Life After Forty?: The John Marshall Law School's Fortieth Annual Conference on In-
tellectual Property, 29 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 841, 850-51 (1996); Lemley & Moore, supra 
note 8, at 64-73; David L. Marcus, Is the Submarined Patent Torpedoed?: Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lemelson and the Revival of Continuation Application Laches, 70 TEMPLE L. REv. 521, 524 
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discrepancies in pendency times between various technologies.37 A 
more accurate picture is likely shown in the results of a study based 
on a sample of litigated patents, finding that the average prosecution 
(or pendency) time for an ultimately successful patent is 3.6 years, 
with a median of 2.7 years.38 Anecdotally, the time period from filing 
to issuance varies by technology and ranges from twenty-four to 
thirty-six months for chemical and mechanical arts and thirty-six to 
sixty months for electrical and software arts. 
During the dead period associated with application pendency, the 
patent application is undergoing a process called "examination." 
Upon filing, an application receives a cursory review for formalities, 
such as the presence of all necessary pages and requisite signa-
tures.39 The Patent Office then classifies the application by technol-
ogy and assigns it to an art unit, or group of examiners, and the ap-
plication eventually ends up at the bottom of the pile of applications 
on the desk of a particular examiner.40 At this point, the application 
process stalls until the application reaches the top of the examiner's 
pile. Once the application surfaces, the examiner ideally reads the 
application, searches for and identifies relevant prior art, reads that 
prior art, decides whether the application should be allowed by com-
paring the claims to the prior art, and then issues an "Office Action," 
explaining to the applicant which, if any,. claims are rejected and 
why.41 The applicant can then respond to the Office Action by making 
(1997); Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 263, 265-66 (1995). 
37. For exantple, "low-tech" inventions may have a considerably shorter pendency, see 
Bartow, supra note 16, at 18, while electrical inventions are experiencing the greatest 
backlog and pendency times. See 2002 PrO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 20; see also 
Peter R. Lando, Business Method Patents: Update Post State Street, 9 TEx. INTELL. PROP. 
L. J. 403 app. at 427 (2001) (citing http://www.uspto.gov/webloffices/com/annual/1999/ 
99tbs1-10.pdf) (showing mechanical-type patent applications averaged 23.4 months to is-
sue, while biotechnology-type applications averaged 29.0 months and communications-type 
applications averaged 31.4 months); David Poppet al., Time in Purgatory: Determinants of 
the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 9518, 2003) (concluding that while inventor characteristics have statistically sig-
nificant effects on length of patent pendency, the most important factor affecting pendency 
is differences across technology). 
38. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Liti-
gated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237 (1998). The difference between the median and the 
average times found in this study is likely attributable to the variance in pendency times 
between technologies. It is important to note that the even the mean pendency is substan-
tially greater than the average reported by the Patent Office. Because this study is focused 
on litigated patents, however, it is possible that patents intended for nontraditional patent 
uses may issue more quickly. Cf. Bartow, supra note 16, at 18. 
39. For exantple, the Office of Initial Patent Exantination (OIPE) "reviews application 
papers to determine whether all of the pages of specification are present in the applica-
tion." U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEp'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 601.01 (8th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
40. See id. § 903.08(a). 
41. See generally id. ch. 700. 
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arguments that the examiner has misapprehended either the 
claimed invention or the prior art and/or the applicant may amend 
the claims to try to overcome the examiner's rejections.42 This give-
and-take process of Office Actions and responses between the exam-
iner and applicant can, in theory, go through much iteration. When 
the examiner and the applicant reach an agreement as to the pat-
entable subject matter, the patent will issue.43 If the examiner and 
the applicant do not reach agreement, the examiner will issue what 
is called a "final rejection."44 At this stage, the applicant may aban-
don the application or may seek appeal of the rejection to the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).45 Alternatively, the ap-
plicant can restart the examination process by filing a request for 
continued examination (RCE).46 This continuation application sets up 
another round of give-and-take between the applicant and the exam-
iner.47 So long as the continuation application is timely filed, the 
process can be repeated ad infinitum.48 Although the examination 
process may seem at first blush to be an extensive process, easily jus-
tifying the number of years that it takes for a patent to issue, it is es-
timated that the entire process involves approximately eighteen 
42. ld. §§ 713-14. 
43. Alternatively, the examination process may come to an end when the applicant 
simply abandons the application for whatever reason. 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2000) ("Upon failure 
of the applicant to prosecute the application within six months after any action therein, of 
which notice has been given or mailed to the applicant, ... the application shall be re-
garded as abandoned by the parties thereto .... ").An application can also be affirmatively 
abandoned. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.138 (2004); MPEP § 711.01. 
44. The term "final rejection" is a misnomer because the applicant has a number of 
options at this point to proceed with the patent application process. See ROBERT P. MERGES 
ET AL., INTEu.ECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 116 (3d ed. 2003) ("The 
label 'final rejection' is a misnomer if ever there was one."); Lemley & Moore, supra note 8, 
at 67. 
45. For a discussion of the appeal process, see generally MPEP chapter 1200. In fiscal 
year 2002, 3125 appeals were filed with the BPAI. BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & 
INTERFERENCES, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2002 (2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/dpaildocs/process/ 
fy2002.htm. In 2003, 2721 appeals were filed. BD. OF PATENT APPEALS & INTERFERENCES, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROCESS PRODUCTION REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003 
(2003), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/dpai/docs/process/fy2003.htm. Although the 
appeals process has been criticized for its extensive backlog, taking years for an appeal to 
be decided, the BPAI claims to have made significant strides in reducing this backlog and 
is currently reviewing appeals filed within the last year or two, depending on the technol-
ogy area involved. See Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcomlbpai!bpaifaq.htm#8_1 (last visited Oct. 7, 
2005) (noting improvement in processing times). 
46. See 35 U.S. C.§ 132. The RCE then provides continued examination of the applica-
tion. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.114. 
47. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 8, at 68 n.14. Although Professors Lemley and 
Moore studied continuation applications under 35 U.S.C. § 120, their discussion and analy-
sis are applicable for RCEs as well. 
48. ld. at 68. 
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hours of examiner time.49 The inevitable question is, What is occur-
ring in the two to three years that a patent is pending if only eight-
een man-hours are attributable to actual examination? To be sure, 
applicants are responsible for a portion of the interval.50 However, 
most applications sit buried in the pile of applications on an exam-
iner's desk for over sixteen months, waiting for an examiner to even 
begin the review process.51 
The answer to the question of why patent applications sit for so 
long before any action is taken may be a simple matter of numbers. 
Over 333,600 patent applications were filed in 2002,52 and the num-
ber of applications filed each year has been growing exponentially.53 
The Patent Office, when faced with this daunting pile of applications, 
has an incentive to move applications off the patent grant highway 
quickly. One way to accomplish this is to issue patents; however, the 
concern is that the Patent Office is issuing patents too quickly, re-
sulting in potentially bad patents.54 Thus, at the heart of both the 
49. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1500 (citing Brenda Sandburg, Speed Over Sub· 
stance?, RECORDER: lNTELL. PROP. MAG., Mar. 1999, at 5 (estimating eighteen hours for 
some patents); Thomas, supra note 3, at 314 (estimating sixteen to seventeen hours). 
50. Applicants are given a period of time to respond to every communication from the 
Patent Office. Most notably, an applicant has three months to reply to an office action. 
MPEP § 710.02(b). This term can be extended to a six-month statutory deadline for re-
sponding (i.e., obtain a three-month extension) by paying additional fees. Id. § 710.02(e). 
One study has examined the allocation of this interval between the Patent Office and the 
applicant based on technology. (Because this study is a few years older, the total pendency 
time may not match that reported in note 35, supra.) 
See Lando, supra note 37, at 427 app. E. 
51. See 2002 PrO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 13 (estimating the average time 
from filing to first Office Action is 16.7 months). This time has increased from 13.8 months 
in fiscal year 1999. Id. at 21. 
52. Id. at 22. 
53. See supra note 15. 
54. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 8, at 68 (noting that, because of continuation 
practice, there is no guaranteed way to make an applicant "go away, although allowing the 
applicant's patent claims increases the chance that the case will finally be disposed of'); id. 
at 74-76 (discussing the "notoriously heavy caseloads" of examiners, the pressure to dis-
pose of the applications, and the resultant bad patents that issue for these reasons); Lem-
ley, supra note 3, at 1496 n.3 (discussing the "pressures on examiners to issue patents 
rather than reject applications," regardless of the strength of the invention, including the 
little time allotted for each application; the fact that examiners are only rewarded for "get-
ting applications out the door," which, because of the continuation practice, only truly hap-
2005] DECREASING CONGESTION IN PATENT OFFICE 133 
speed and the quality problems in the Patent Office is the over-
crowded nature of the patent grant system: there are simply too 
many cars on the patent grant highway. One solution to this over-
crowding, in keeping with the highway metaphor, is to build more 
roads. The multitiered patent grant system proposed below is one po-
tential solution to this problem. 
III. PATENT APPLICATIONS AS DRIVERS ON THE HIGHWAY 
Returning to the highway metaphor presented above, a model 
patent grant highway system can be defined to include three differ-
ent types of patent applications. In particular, this Article catego-
rizes patent applications as one of three types of "drivers" on the pat-
ent grant highway-Sunday drivers, regular drivers, and ambulance 
drivers.55 The underlying bases for this categorization model are the 
inventor's intent and the inventor's understanding of market reali-
ties. The three-type paradigm finds further support in the notion 
that applications filed for different reasons have differing examina-
tion and patent grant needs and, moreover, implicate different socie-
tal costs. 
A. Sunday Driver Applications 
The Sunday driver category of patent applications is populated by 
a diverse group of applications; however, all applications fitting in 
this category share the fact that either there is no a priori intent to 
litigate or license or there is no clear, immediate market value. On 
the model patent grant highway, these applications are cruising to no 
particular destination. 
The very name of this application type may evoke one component 
of the Sunday driver application group, the so-called garage inventor. 
A garage inventor may seek a patent simply to acquire something 
with his or her name on it or as a matter of self-validation. Even if 
the garage inventor seeks a patent believing that he or she has in-
vented the "next great thing," the inventor may be mistaken or igno-
rant about the patent's actual worth in the market or may be facing 
other obstacles preventing the commercialization of the invention 
and subsequent exercise of the patent's monopoly grant. Although it 
may be a natural inclination to assume that this type of patent appli-
cation creates the bulk of Sunday driver applications, the number of 
applications filed by true garage inventors is actually quite small. 
pens when a patent issues; and the fact that while reasons for rejection are required, rea-
sons for allowance are not); see also Merges, supra note 3, at 590, 609. 
55. It should be clear that these titles, while potentially invoking generalizations 
about certain segments of society, serve only to forward an easily understood metaphor 
and should not be taken as disparaging, either against drivers or inventions. 
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Surprisingly, applications filed by corporations, as what Professor 
Bartow calls "portfolio fiber," are the largest component of Sunday 
driver applications.56 Patents issuing from these applications may be 
intended for use only in marketing.57 Alternatively, a corporation 
may be bulking up its portfolio either to convey information about 
the firm or the invention, perhaps to increase the expected value of 
the firm,58 or in preparation for licensing negotiations-where the 
quantity, that is, the size of a corporation's stack of intellectual prop-
erty, rather than the quality therein, may be relevant.59 In any case, 
these patents are unlikely to be litigated, are probably not going to 
form the meat of any licensing negotiation (other than in their bulk 
capacity), and may never even be commercialized. In short, the pat-
ents issued from Sunday driver applications are unlikely to take ad-
vantage of any of the classic patent benefits of exclusion. 
Largely unique to Sunday driver applications is that if the appli-
cant intends to exercise an inventor's traditional patent reward and 
commercialize the invention, there may be a period of time required 
for the inventor to determine the market realities and barriers faced. 
Because commercialization is often an expensive process and in-
cludes, for example, the costs ofbuilding or retooling a factory, mate-
rials, product placement fees, and marketing, an applicant will want 
to determine if the cost of commercialization is worthwhile. This de-
termination often will need to be made prior to the issuance of a pat-
ent, particularly if the patent pendency period is long. Essentially, an 
application may be filed by an applicant unsure of whether commer-
cialization is a viable option.60 During the period of pendency, how-
ever, the applicant may complete the required cost-benefit analysis 
and determine that he will not be able to commercialize the inven-
tion. Depending on the status of the inventor and the nature of the 
patent, the patentee may be then unable to utilize any of the tradi-
tional benefits of patent law. In fact, it is not unreasonable to con-
56. See Bartow, supra note 16, at 3 ("[These patents) may add fiber to patent portfo-
lios (fiber that is devoid of nutrition perhaps but at least constituting bulk)."). 
57. See id. (citing, for example, a commercial advertising "twenty-three patents em-
bodied in a single toothbrush"). Also, see Bartow, id., for a more detailed discussion of al-
ternative patent usages, including as advertising tools. 
58. See Long, supra note 17, at 636-37 (noting that patents provide readily available 
and inexpensive means of communicating credible information that may make a firm more 
attractive and thus more able to capture investments and venture capital); see also Par-
chomovsky & Wagner, supra note 18. 
59. See Caruso, supra note 4 ("'The big [companies) couldn't care less about the qual-
ity of their patents,' [Gregory) Aharonian said. 'They just want as many as possible be-
cause they trade them like baseball cards. When you have a thousand patents and your 
competition has 1,500, you don't care what they are, you just swap them.m). 
60. In fact, statutory law encourages the applicant to file the patent application before 
the applicant can ascertain the viability of commercialization. See 35 U.S.C. §102(b) (2000) 
(providing an absolute bar to a patent where the invention was "in public use or on sale in 
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent"). 
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elude that a number of patents, sought with the intent of commer-
cializing, end up having no use at all. At this point, the question may 
arise about the inventor's recourse upon realizing that the invention 
is not valuable under traditional patent benefit theory. The newly 
enlightened inventor can certainly abandon the application, thus re-
lieving himself of the burden of additional prosecution costs; how-
ever, given that publication of applications occurs eighteen months 
after filing, the inventor will not be able to revert the invention to the 
trade secret that it may have been before the patent application was 
filed.61 
Also unique to the Sunday driver applications is the level of re-
quired scrutiny. As noted above, all applications are, in theory, 
treated equally. Here, where the patentee has no intent upon filing 
the application of commercializing the underlying invention, the level 
of scrutiny and resources expended in examining the application may 
not need to be as great as for those that will be litigated or licensed.62 
Even in the case where the original intent is to commercialize, many 
resources are being expended examining patent applications that, 
had the inventor had sufficient time to fully understand or investi-
gate the market realities prior to examination, he may not have pur-
sued. 
The current patent grant system, however, does recognize these 
distinctions. All patent applications are fully examined regardless of 
intended use. The current patent system does purport to provide 
mechanisms to allow a patentee to investigate the viability of the 
commercialization of the patent. First, the novelty requirements of 
patentability allow a patentee a twelve-month grace period. That is, 
the invention may be described in a printed publication, be used pub-
licly, or be on sale in this country for a period of less than one year 
before a patent application is filed without destroying the novelty 
condition for patentability.63 Beyond the one-year grace period, pat-
ent laws provide another mechanism-the provisional application-
allowing a patentee additional time to determine the market realities 
by permitting an applicant to file a patent application which is not 
immediately examined and which acts merely as a placeholder.64 
61. Although there are mechanisms to withdraw an application from the publication 
queue by express abandonment more than four weeks prior to the publication date, see 37 
C.F.R. § 1.138 (2004), this presumes that the patent applicant can ascertain the value 
within the first seventeen months of pendency. This may not always be the case. 
62. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1508 (noting that "the overwhelming majority of pat-
ents are never used in a way that calls their validity into question"). 
63. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the inven-
tion was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States."). 
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000); MPEP § 201.04 (b). 
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Within twelve months of filing the provisional patent application, the 
applicant must either file a regular patent application claiming prior-
ity to the provisional application or convert the provisional applica-
tion to a nonprovisional application. Otherwise, the subject matter is 
abandoned.65 The problem is that in many cases, such as an inven-
tion concerning a cutting-edge technology that has not been widely 
adopted or an inventor lacking sufficient networks or resources to 
quickly ascertain the worth of his or her patent, a twelve-month in-
vestigatory period may be insufficient,66 forcing the applicant to 
choose to have the patent examined before fully understanding the 
market realities, lest the priority date be lost. 
B. Regular Driver Applications 
It is true that the traditional patent reward paradigm may not 
apply to all patent applications, but certainly a significant number of 
patent applications do fall under this rubric.67 The applicant may 
plan to commercialize the patent and may intend to litigate or license 
the subject matter of the patent application as required. The appli-
cant may have a reasonable understanding of the market realities 
faced, either through experience or other insight, or at the very least, 
there is a colorable presumption of market value. While there is no 
requirement that the patent application issue quickly,68 any time 
spent in the dead period of patent pendency detracts from the 
amount of "life" of the patent and adds to the overall congestion 
within the patent grant system. 
One large component of regular driver applications may be phar-
maceutical patent applications, which have a reasonably ascertain-
able market value by the time a patent application is filed69 but have 
no real need for the patent to issue quickly. This is due in part to the 
65. 35 U.S.C. §§ lll(b)(5), 119(e) (2000). 
66. An inventor who takes advantage of both the twelve-month grace period for nov-
elty and the twelve-month provisional application period arguably has twenty-four months 
in which to investigate the viability of commercialization. 
67. Although evidence suggests that only five percent of patents may be litigated or 
licensed, more may fall into this category. First, the inventor's intent at the time of filing 
may be to use the patent to commercialize and exclude or otherwise control access, but 
then he may be unable to do so. Second, the figure of five percent may be somewhat mis-
leading due to claim scope and patent portfolios. 
68. This is in contrast to the ambulance driver applications. See discussion infra Part 
Ill. C. 
69. It can be argued that pharmaceutical patent applications, when filed, do not have 
a readily ascertainable market value because of the uncertainty of FDA approval. How-
ever, while not every pharmaceutical patent application will result in a patent having clear 
value, the pharmaceutical industry has a historical knowledge base that permits an esti-
mation of what percentage of pharmaceutical patent applications will mature into usable 
patents. For this reason, although each individual application may have an uncertain 
market value, the industry can still ascertain a market value for patent applications gen-
erally. 
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length accompanying the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ap-
proval process70 and in part to a powerful congressional lobby that 
has obtained provisions to extend a pharmaceutical patent's term be-
yond the twenty-year period because of the additional dead period 
due to the FDA regulatory approval process.71 
Although the regular driver application category may not have 
any peculiar needs unaddressed by the current patent system, it is 
clear that the overarching problems of speed of issue and quality are 
equally present in this category. Moreover, as referenced above, the 
abundance of patent applications in the other two categories, particu-
larly the Sunday driver applications, exacerbates the problems faced 
by regular driver applications by adding to the congestion in the Pat-
ent Office. 
C. Ambulance Driver Applications 
Ambulance driver applications, as the name may imply, reside at 
the opposite end of the spectrum from Sunday driver applications. 
These applications have well-recognized market value, but maximum 
benefit is derived only if the application reaches its destination 
quickly; that is, the patent must issue quickly. Consider a hypotheti-
cal from the computer industry, one technology area where ambu-
lance driver applications are likely to be prevalent. For example, if a 
person invented an extra-fast computer chip, faster than any of the 
Pentium chips available in today's market, and filed a patent appli-
cation for this chip, the patent application would, in all likelihood, 
take three to five years to issue.72 By the time the patent is granted, 
again in all likelihood, the technology would be obsolete, probably by 
70. For more information about this process, see generally Jian Xiao, Carving Out a 
Biotechrwlogy Research Tool Exception to the Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 27l(E)(l), 12 TEx.INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 27-28 (2003). 
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2000) (extending a patent from the original expiration 
date if "the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial 
marketing or use"). This section further provides that the patent term shall be extended 
"by the time equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product which period 
occurs after the date the patent is issued," subject to due diligence by the applicant during 
the regulatory review period and further limited such that the period of patent term re-
maining after approval when added to the possible term extension for the regulatory re-
view period shall not exceed fourteen years. ld. §156 (c)(l), (3). The products covered under 
this provision include human and veterinary drug products, as covered by the federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Public Health Service Act, and/or the Virus-Serum-
Toxin Act, as well as medical devices, food additives, or color additives subject to regulation 
under the FDCA. ld. § 156 (d)(2)(A). 
72. Electronic, and particularly computer, patent applications suffer from among the 
greatest backlogs in patent pendency. See supra note 35. While this data includes delay at-
tributable to both the patentee and the Patent Office, it is logical to assume that the pat-
entee, in the case of an ambulance driver application, would have no incentive to delay on 
his own behalf. 
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a couple of years.73 Unfortunately for our hypothetical inventor, not 
only will the technology be obsolete, but the patent, when finally 
granted, will not be worth nearly as much, if anything, to the pat-
entee.74 
Interestingly, ambulance driver applications may suffer not only 
from problems with the speed of issuance, but may also be some of 
the prime candidates for bad patents. One reason is that in a rapidly 
evolving technology, a defining characteristic of this application type, 
it is difficult for the Patent Office to maintain a sufficient grasp on 
the state of the prior art. 75 It has been noted that in these fields tech-
nical knowledge is unlikely to be widely disseminated, residing in-
stead in the hands of so-called experts. 76 As such, especially in areas 
of cutting-edge technology, information regarding prior art is more 
likely to be known to an applicant and his competitors and colleagues 
in the same field, rather than to the Patent Office.77 
To the extent the current patent system is not set up to deal with 
Sunday driver applications, since it is based on a presumption that 
all patents are being sought for the traditional patent law benefits, 
the system is also ill-equipped to deal with ambulance driver applica-
tions. One problem is that there is no general mechanism to speed 
patents through the system. 78 In fact, the technological areas con-
templated to benefit the most from addressing the particular prob-
lems of ambulance applications-that is, technological areas with 
rapid obsolescence such as electronics-are, in fact, often subject to 
73. See, e.g., Alex Salkever, Information Age Byproduct: A Growing Trail of Toxic 
Trash, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 16, 1999, at 2 ("The speed of computer chips and the 
machines they power has doubled about every 18 months for the past 20 years. In 1997, 
the average lifespan of a computer tower was four to six years. By 2005, the lifespan will 
only be two years."). 
74. Of course, depending on the breadth of claim scope and the ability to resort to the 
doctrine of equivalents, the inventor may be able to counter obsolescence and still derive 
some worth from the patent. 
75. Although the example given above discusses computer hardware, the knowledge 
deficit problem is much greater with respect to computer software/business method inven-
tions. However, both computer software and hardware, as well as other rapidly obsolescing 
technology, fall under the umbrella of the ambulance driver application. 
76. Kesan, supra note 2, at 767 (citing Freidrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in So-
ciety, 35 AMER. ECON. REv. 519-30 (1945)). 
77. ld. 
78. Although there is no true procedure to speed patent applications through the Pat-
ent Office, there is one mechanism, known as a petition to make special, which allows an 
application to be examined out of turn under particular circumstances. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 
(2004). The circumstances include the following: (1) a showing of prospective manufacture; 
(2) a showing of actual infringement; (3) a showing that the state of health of the applicant 
is such that he might not be able to assist if prosecution were to run its full course; (4) evi-
dence that the applicant is sixty-five or more years of age; and (5) inventions related to 
particular areas of interest, such as environmental quality, energy, recombinant DNA, su-
perconductivity, HIV/AIDS, cancer cures and treatments, and counterterrorism measures. 
I d.; MPEP § 708.02. 
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the greatest backlog at the Patent Office today. 79 Although an appli-
cant can reduce a patent application's pendency by filing very narrow 
claims that are most likely to be allowed in the first Office Action, 
this does not effect the pendency attributable to the Patent Office. 
Further, this tactic may not best serve the interest of the inventor if 
the resulting patent is of a narrower scope than that to which the in-
ventor was entitled. 
The inventor, having been issued a patent of narrower scope than 
that to which he was entitled does have some recourse. Under the 
continuation practice described above, the patentee can, before the 
patent issues, file a continuation application to seek broader claims 
and keep the examination process alive. Alternatively, the patentee 
can, within two years, file a reissue application with broader claims.80 
One of the concerns that arises from this practice is that a competitor 
who relied on the original patent to design around or otherwise com-
pete with the patent may find that the activities that were not origi-
nally covered are now covered by the reissued patent.81 This inequity 
is addressed by intervening rights, which offer a limited defense to 
patent infringement.82 Both absolute and equitable intervening 
rights are available. Absolute intervening rights permit the patentee 
no recourse under the Patent Act, and the court must grant the in-
fringer relief. 83 Equitable intervening rights, on the other hand, per-
mit the court to allow the infringer to continue to infringe, either by 
performing the infringing process or by continuing to make, use, sell, 
I d. 
I d. 
79. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, 
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specifi-
cation or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he 
had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall ... reissue the patent for 
the invention disclosed in the original patent application and in accordance 
with a new and amended application .... No reissued patent shall be granted 
enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for 
within two years from the grant of the original patent. 
81. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat'l Nut Co. of Cal., 310 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1940). 
[T]he patentee might have included in the application for the original patent, 
claims broad enough to embrace petitioner's accused machine, but did not. This 
"gave the public to understand" that whatever was not claimed "did not come 
within his patent and might rightfully be made by anyone." ... Recapture 
within two years of what a patentee dedicates to the public through omission is 
permissible under specified conditions, but not, we think, "at the expense of in-
nocent parties." 
82. 35 u.s.c. § 252 (2000). 
83. See BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (discussing the absolute intervening rights found in the first sentence of the sec-
ond paragraph of section 252). 
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or offer for sale articles made before the reissue or for which the in-
fringer has made substantial preparations prior to reissue.84 
Another problem is that a patentee under the current patent 
grant system is required to submit an information disclosure state-
ment (IDS), listing all of the material prior art about which the ap-
plicant is aware.85 However, the applicant is under no obligation to 
search for additional prior art, even though the applicant may be in 
the best position to know where to look for that prior art-especially 
in pioneering or rapidly developing technology areas. Commentators, 
however, have suggested that the Patent Office raise this standard of 
disclosure to require an applicant to search for relevant prior art.86 
The categorization paradigm proposed above may simplify the of-
ten complex thought processes of applicants in seeking patent protec-
tion, but it does clarify the failings of the current one-size-fits-all, 
traditional patent benefit model of the patent grant system. The big-
gest problem may be that, while scholars and commentators readily 
recognize that the traditional patent reward model does not apply to 
all patentees,87 the patent grant system does not make any such con-
cessions. In addition to the sheer overwhelming number of patent 
applications filed each year in the Patent Office, the expectation is 
that each of these applications receives at least the same level of 
scrutiny.88 Both of these factors certainly contribute to the congestion 
84. See Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing 
the equitable intervening rights found in the second sentence of the second paragraph of 
section 252). 
85. Compare the proposal set forth in this Article, infra Part IV, with 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 
(2004) (setting deadlines for filing of an IDS) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2004) (setting the con-
tent of an IDS). An IDS need only include "[a) concise explanation of the relevance" only for 
those references submitted in a language other than English. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a}(3)(i) 
(2004). Further, an IDS "shall not be construed as a representation that a search has been 
made." ld. § 1.97(g). In fact, the patentee's duty to disclose extends only to "all information 
known to that individual to be material to patentability." Id. § 1.56(a) (emphasis added). 
86. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 2, at 773-75; Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent 
Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 177, 200-03 (2005). 
Without more, however, this heightened standard may encourage the act of "dumptruck-
ing," or piling every conceivable piece of prior art on the examiner's desk to either avoid the 
appearance of inadequate disclosure or to bury a relevant and damaging piece of prior art. 
Given the limited amount of time available for examiners to read and understand the rele-
vance of the prior art, these proposals, while facially appealing, may not result in better 
patents. 
87. See, e.g., Long, supra note 17, at 627 (challenging the view "that exclusivity is the 
alpha and the omega ofthe private value of patent rights"). 
88. That each patent application receives the same level of scrutiny is the subject of 
debate. For example, Gene Quinn, law professor and founder ofiPWatchdog.com, made the 
following statement quoted on the blog Patently Obvious: 
There seems to be a double standard in the [Patent O)ffice. Things that are 
silly/stupid get patented without much time or consideration, perhaps because 
the Patent Office doesn't believe anyone will ever use the patent. Things that 
are what we would consider "science related" actually get stricter scrutiny. 
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plaguing the Patent Office and affecting the speed metric of patents 
granted. The Patent Office's solution to this congestion-limiting the 
amount of time spent by examiners on each application-decreases, 
at least in theory, the quality metric of patents granted. The next 
Part proposes a multitier patent grant system that addresses the pe-
culiar needs of each of the three patent application types while at-
tempting also to improve the speed of issuance and quality of patents 
granted generally. 
IV. PROPOSED MULTITIER PATENT SYSTEM 
In contrast to the current single-tier patent system, which is ill-
equipped to handle patent application types of different categories, 
this Article proposes a multitier patent system. The proposed patent 
grant system includes three tiers-the primary patent, the enforcer 
patent, and the techno-patent-each associated with one of the pat-
ent application types described in Part III, supra.89 Although each 
patent tier is targeted at a patent application type and particularly 
addresses the needs associated with that patent type, the overall 
scheme should also resolve the patent quality and speed issues that 
generally trouble the Patent Office. 
A. Primary Patent 
The primary patent is aimed at Sunday driver patent applica-
tions. An application for a primary patent would require the same 
components as are required for current patent applications90 and 
would be subject to the same filing rules and fees as the current pat-
ent application. Upon filing, an application for a primary patent 
would receive only a cursory examination and then be granted.91 The 
This may make some sense, but the patent laws do not make such a distinc-
tion. 
Silly Inventions Axe Easy to Patent?, http:l/patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2004/09 (Sept. 
24, 2004). 
89. The tenns primary patent, enforcer patent, and techno-patent are used solely for 
ease of reference and should not inlpute an additional meaning on any of the patent types. 
90. In general, an application shall be made in writing and include a specification, a 
drawing, and an oath by the applicant. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2000). The application 
must be accompanied by a fee. ld. § 111(3). The specification shall contain a written de-
scription of the invention, sufficiently detailed to enable one of skill in the relevant art to 
make and use the invention, as well as set forth the best mode of carrying out the inven-
tion as contemplated by the inventor. ld. § 112. "The specification shall conclude with one 
or more clainls particularly pointing out and distinctly clainling the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as his invention." ld. Drawings shall be furnished "where necessary 
for the understanding of the subject matter sought to be patented." ld. § 113. Finally, "[t]he 
applicant shall make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of 
the [invention] for which he solicits a patent." ld. § 115. 
91. It should be noted that the primary patent proposed in this Article does not seek 
to replicate the registration model proposed by some commentators. See, e.g., F. Scott 
Kieft", The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent· 
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primary patent would remain in force for twenty years from the filing 
date, the same as with current patents. However, because the pri-
mary patent would not receive a full examination by the Patent Of-
fice, the patentee would not be able to enforce the patent through 
litigation. Although unavailable for litigation (and therefore poten-
tially less desirable for licensing for royalties), the primary patent 
would be available for nontraditional patent usages such as market-
ing or self-validation,92 uses which do not necessarily require the 
heightened standards of validity expected for patents under the tra-
ditional patent benefit paradigm. Patent Office resources are there-
fore not expended on examining applications whose validity is highly 
unlikely, if ever, to be called into question. 
Although it could not be litigated, a primary patent would serve 
as a quick method for demarking an inventor's territory until the ap-
plicant could fully ascertain the market realities surrounding the 
subject matter of the invention. At any time during the primary pat-
ent's twenty-year life, if the patentee determines that the primary 
patent's value could be better reaped through litigation or other 
means of traditional patent usage, the primary patent may be con-
verted to an enforcer patent93 by paying additional fees and subject-
ing the patent application to a full examination. By allowing this 
conversion to occur at any time during the primary patent's twenty-
year life, the applicant would have sufficient time to make an in-
formed decision about whether the invention is worth expending both 
his and the Patent Office's resources. In some respects then, a pri-
mary patent may be viewed as simply an extended provisional patent 
practice. 
The benefits provided to society and the inventor by current pro-
visional practice, however, fall far short of the potential benefits en-
visioned with the proposed primary patent. With respect to the in-
ventor, provisional practice affords only twelve months to determine 
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55 (2003). Although many of the same rationales support 
the initiation of a registration only, or "soft-look" system, the particular paradigm adopted 
in this Article relies on the theory that there are different types of patent applications, 
each with peculiar needs, which are not addressed in a one-size-fits-all patent grant sys-
tem. 
92. It can be argued that a patent that is unenforceable, in its current stage, would be 
of little marketing value. However, the primary patent could still signal innovation and/or 
technological prowess to either the public (in the case of mainstream marketing of prod-
ucts) or to venture capitalists or other investors. The primary patent, although it does not 
come with the imprimatur of the Patent Office's examination, still has value in that it pro-
vides a staked claim around the inventor's asserted territory and can be, if commercially 
viable, converted to an enforcer patent and enjoy all the rights of a regular patent, includ-
ing the right to be enforced via litigation. This view, however, may receive some opposition 
from commentators who believe that the underlying value of patents as signals or patent 
portfolios is in the exclusionary right. 
93. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
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whether to pursue a nonprovisional, or regular, patent, whereas the 
proposed primary patent would allow the pursuit of an enforcer pat-
ent (similar to a nonprovisional patent) at any time during the pat-
ent's twenty-year life.94 Further, because provisional patents auto-
matically expire twelve months after filing (if not converted to a non-
provisional patent or if a non-provisional patent claiming priority to 
the provisional application is not filed), the current provisional pat-
ent offers little in the way of nontraditional usage. Primary patents, 
by comparison, could be used to obtain many, if not all, of the non-
traditional patent benefits without taxing the Patent Office's re-
sources. In contrast to provisional applications, which are currently 
not published (in part due to the fact that the provisional application 
expires before the eighteen-month publication date), the issuance of a 
primary patent benefits society by putting the public on notice and 
disclosing the new technology to the public and by enabling society to 
ascertain and design around a competitor's technology more quickly 
or make further technological advances based on the disclosed inven-
tion. In this respect, the primary patent serves many of the same 
purposes as the current process of publication of pending patent ap-
plication at eighteen months post-filing, without expending the Pat-
ent Office resources, for a patent whose validity, at least at the time 
of filing, is not anticipated to be questioned. 
One concern raised with respect to the proposed primary patent 
system comes from the possibility of abuse. For example, without a 
substantive examination, there is no mechanism to stop a patentee 
from submitting an application with wildly overbroad claims and 
then harassing competitors with the issued primary patent. An over-
simplistic answer is that a patentee having that motivation is 
unlikely to file for a primary patent, since there would be no sub-
stance behind the threat. Even if the patentee makes threats based 
on a primary patent, competitors would suffer no real apprehension, 
because the patentee would not be able to litigate until the primary 
patent was converted to an enforcer patent and subjected to a full 
examination.95 Concerns about the possible chilling effect on innova-
tion that may be caused by the issuance of overbroad primary patent 
claims may be addressed by analogy to the current publication of 
patent applications. Namely, there seems to have been no increase in 
filing of "kitchen sink" patents since the implementation of the publi-
94. The caveat, explained in detail infra Part IV.B, however, is that the total life of 
the patent includes time spent as a primary patent and time spent as an enforcer patent. 
The twenty-year clock does not restart upon conversion from a primary patent to an en-
forcer patent. 
95. Similarly, a competitor would be unable to file a declaratory judgment action to 
have the patent invalidated in court because there is no reasonable apprehension. How-
ever, the competitor could resort to the reexamination procedure outlined infra Part IV.B. 
144 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:119 
cation provisions in 2000, and there is no reason to believe that the 
implementation of a primary patent system would generate any such 
increase. 96 
Finally, after issuance, a primary patent would be subject to an 
administrative revocation procedure to address any overbroad or 
otherwise potentially invalid claims. Although the current reexami-
nation procedure97 allows third-party validity challenges of granted 
patents through the Patent Office, it is too flawed in many respects 
to alleviate invalidity problems in the current patent system.98 How-
ever, the existing reexamination provisions may well suit validity 
challenges· to primary patents.99 For this reexamination, a third 
party would bring to the Patent Office one or more pieces of prior art 
considered to invalidate the primary patent. The Patent Office would 
then perform an examination of the primary patent, including review 
of the primary patent with respect to the submitted prior art, and de-
termine whether, in light of all relevant prior art, the primary patent 
meets the requirements of patentability.100 If the primary patent sur-
vives this procedure, and to prevent harassment of a primary pat-
entee by third parties using the reexamination mechanism, the pri-
mary patent would automatically be converted to an enforcer patent, 
since reexamination would provide a substantive examination of the 
patented subject matter. As a side note, because reexamination pro-
visions require the requesting party to submit prior art over which 
the requestor believes the patent is invalid, this sequence of events, 
96. To be sure, most patents issue with claims that are less broad than the claims as 
originally filed and, therefore, published. However, the concern of chilling innovation is 
more related to the potential problem of the issuance of primary patents with extremely 
overbroad claims, leading a competitor to believe invention in the entire technology area is 
precluded. Moreover, after Festo, this practice of filing initially broad claims may be chang-
ing. 
There is also concern that this primary patent system would increase the amount of 
patent applications filed in the Patent Office, which would in tum decrease the ability of 
patents to serve a signaling function. The number of patent applications filed has been in-
creasing exponentially in the absence of this proposal. There is no indication that this pro-
posal would encourage more filings; rather, the filings would simply be categorized differ-
ently. 
97. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-18 {2000) {outlining the reexamination procedure). 
98. See Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is It Time for 
Corrective Surgery, or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 217 {2003). Other commentators have similar questions as to the efficacy ofreexami· 
nation in today's patent system. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: To-
ward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 24-26 {1997). 
99. Clearly the name "reexamination" with respect to primary patents would be a 
misnomer, since primary patents would never have been subject to an initial examination. 
The use of the term is simply to avoid confusion while referring to a process that is already 
in existence in current patent law. 
100. In theory, the reexamination procedure as applied to this proposal could be either 
ex parte or inter partes. Due to certain estoppel rules, inter partes reexamination is not as 
attractive to third parties; however, these rules could be adjusted. 
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with respect to primary patents, would likely result in the primary 
patent receiving the best possible examination upon reexamination 
because it would be in the best interest of the requestor to find the 
best and most relevant prior art, which competitors are often in the 
best position to find. 1o1 
Two additional concerns may be raised with respect to the pro-
posed primary patent system. First, because the primary patent is 
not able to be enforced through litigation, there is no mechanism to 
stop competitors from infringing willfully until such time as the pri-
mary patent is converted to an enforcer patent. The second concern is 
akin to the inequity that arises in reissue applications, where a com-
petitor suddenly finds himself infringing after the scope of the claim 
is broadened.102 In this case, a remedy that is related to both provi-
sional rights (associated with published patent applications) and in-
tervening rights (associated with reissue applications) would address 
both of these problems. Upon conversion to an enforcer patent, the 
patentee would be able to sue for infringement. To the extent that 
the claims in the enforcer patent are substantially identical to the 
claims that were present in the primary patent, the patentee will be 
able to reach backwards for damages into the term of the primary 
patent, for a maximum of four years. The reason for capping the abil-
ity to reach back to a limited time period is to encourage patentees 
who believe that their inventions are being infringed to convert the 
primary patents to enforcer patents, rather than sitting by and lull-
ing competitors into believing that either the patent will not cover 
the infringing activities or that the patentee is disinterested in en-
forcing his rights. On the other hand, to the extent that a competitor 
had a good-faith belief that he had designed around the primary pat-
ent, 103 he may be awarded intervening rights upon the conversion of 
that primary patent to an enforcer patent. 
B. Enforcer Patent 
The enforcer patent is directed towards the regular driver cate-
gory of patent applications and retains most of the current patent 
rules, regulations, and procedures. An applicant can either designate 
an enforcer patent upon initially filing the patent application or 
choose to obtain an enforcer patent through conversion of a primary 
patent during its twenty-year life. An enforcer patent would also 
101. See Miller, supra note 3, at 707-09; Thomas, supra note 3, at 327-28. 
102. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
103. The test for this belief could be similar to that used in willful infringement analy-
ses. Willfulness liability attaches where the "infringer has actual notice of [the plaintiffs] 
patent rights" and failed "to exercise due care to determine whether or not he [was] in-
fringing" upon those rights. Underwater Devices, Inc. v Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 
1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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have a term of twenty years; however, if a primary patent is con-
verted to an enforcer patent, it will still expire twenty years from the 
filing date of the original application for the primary patent. While 
the patent application rules and requirements would remain the 
same as the primary patent (and as set forth in current patent law), 
the fees to file an enforcer patent application will be significantly in-
creased.104 The purpose of increasing the fees is to put a greater bur-
den on the applicant to determine the intended use and market 
worth of the patent application before expending Patent Office re-
sources. The enforcer patent would receive a full, thorough examina-
tion prior to grant and would be able to be litigated upon issuance. 
Publication provisions for patent applications will still apply for en-
forcer patent applications designated as such ab initio. Enforcer pat-
ents resulting from the conversion of primary patents will not be 
published, as the grant of the primary patent serves the purpose of 
publication. Damages may be available for infringement prior to the 
date of issuance of the enforcer patent where the patentee can obtain 
provisional rights from the date of publication under 35 USC 122. Al-
ternatively, where the enforcer patent is based on a converted pri-
mary patent, the patentee may reach back for damages for infringe-
ment prior to the date of issuance of the enforcer patent for up to four 
years to the filing date of the primary patent, whichever is less. Both 
options are subject to the limitation of the claims as published being 
"substantially identical" to the claims as filed.105 
Despite the fact that the only alteration with respect to enforcer 
patents from the current patent laws is the fee structure, the imple-
mentation of the multi tiered system should improve the speed metric 
associated with today's patent grants, because a critical mass of pat-
ent applications could be expected to file at least initially for primary 
patent protection. This decrease in number of applications receiving 
a full examination would conserve Patent Office resources, allowing 
for potentially quicker examination and resulting in fewer bad pat-
ents, by relieving the pressure on the Patent Office to quickly issue 
patents to empty the queue of pending applications. 
At this point, questions may be raised as to whether a simple, fee-
based proposal would not serve the same purposes as the above-
proposed combination of the two patent tiers. In fact, fee-based pro-
104. Upon conversion from a primary patent to an enforcer patent, the applicant will 
need to pay the difference in fees between a primary patent and an enforcer patent along 
with the request for examination. If, however, a primary patent is converted to an enforcer 
patent after a third-party request for reexamination, the patentee will not be responsible 
for the additional fees. This provides an additional incentive to an applicant to file for a 
primary patent, at least initially. 
105. See the discussion, supra Part IV.A, of a remedy combining both provisional 
rights and intervening rights with respect to primary patents. 
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posals-substantially raising the cost of applying for a patent appli-
cation in order to decrease the number of patent applications and/or 
fund greater assistance for the Patent Office-are often considered.106 
The number of patent examiners employed by the Patent Office, 
however, is not constrained by monetary concerns.107 Moreover, sim-
ply increasing the fees required to file a patent application may re-
sult in shutting a small, inventive entity out of the market entirely, 108 
which is contradictory to this country's traditionally paternalistic 
view of such inventors.109 Finally, there is no evidence that simply 
raising fees will result in a significant decrease in the number of pat-
ent applications. Because large corporations file a significant per-
centage of Sunday driver-type patent applications, likely seeking the 
patent for something other than the traditional patent benefit, there 
is no reason to believe that the number of patent applications filed 
will drop merely because they cost more to obtain.110 However, the 
proposed multitier system offers the applicant an attractive alterna-
tive in the primary patent. If the primary patent is also then less ex-
pensive than the enforcer patent, applicants will be encouraged to 
file primary patent applications for those inventions upon which 
106. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 3, at 598 (noting that raising the filing fee may serve 
as some sort of screening mechanism and induce "applicants to sort out the least poten-
tially valuable investments on their own"). 
107. Prior to 1982, the Patent Office did not generate sufficient funding through its 
own fees to cover its expenses, requiring the allocation of additional funding from tax payer 
monies. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 316-17. Congress then altered the patent fee sched-
ule to cover expenses related to application processing, but activities unrelated to applica-
tion processing were funded from tax monies. Id. In 1990, Congress again altered the fee 
structure to remove the Patent Office's reliance on public revenue by imposing a temporary 
surcharge. ld. at 317. Initially the surplus from the new fee schedule was returned to the 
Patent Office, but it began to be diverted to other areas of government throughout the life 
of the surcharge. Id. Even after the surcharge expired, Congress continued to divert fees by 
placing a ceiling on the Patent Office's revenue. Id. Fee diversion from the Patent Office 
remains a hot-button issue among members of the patent bar. However, President Bush's 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2005 allocates to the Patent Office all $1.533 billion in fees 
projected to be generated through application and other patent fees. Press Release, Dep't of 
Commerce, President's Proposed Budget Ends USPTO Fee Diversion in FY 2005 (Feb. 2, 
2004), available at www.uspto.gov/weh'offices/com/speeches/04-03.htm. 
108. At this point there may be concern that the small inventor will simply end up with 
a worthless primary patent (worthless in that it cannot be enforced or converted without 
substantial fees). However, the provisional/intervening rights remedy provides the primary 
patent with some teeth, and further, if it becomes commercially viable to convert to an en-
forcer patent, there is no reason to expect that the primary patentee will be unable to ob-
tain funding to convert the patent from, for example, a competitor of the infringer or some 
other "angel." 
109. See Seifert, supra note 32, at 197. 
110. In fact, the major portion of costs associated with obtaining a patent may be at-
tributed to attorney fees, rather than Patent Office fees. Further, if cost were a deterrent, 
it would be expected that the number of patent applications would decline during an eco-
nomic downturn. However, recent Patent Office figures show this is not true. See 2002 
PTO ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 15 (noting a 2.3% increase in applications filed in 
2002 over 2001, "despite the downturn in the economy"). 
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commercialization is not anticipated or intended, 111 even if the appli-
cant is a corporation that would otherwise expend the additional 
money required to obtain a traditional patent on these inventions. 
The primary patent would still provide the corporation with a tool for 
nontraditional uses.112 
C. Techno-Patent 
Finally, the techno-patent is aimed at the ambulance driver cate-
gory of applications discussed above. Although the name "techno-
patent" may imply that the patent is available only for high-tech in-
ventions, it should be understood that the option of each of the three 
patent types (that is, primary patent, enforcer patent, and techno-
patent) would be at the discretion of the applicant. However, the 
burdens associated with the techno-patent will likely deter appli-
cants from choosing this route unless the subject matter of the patent 
is in a high-tech field with a short life cycle. To deal with the prob-
lems peculiar to the ambulance driver applications, a techno-patent 
is guaranteed to grant within one year of application. In return for 
speedy issuance, an application for a techno-patent must be submit-
ted to the Patent Office with both the results of a prior art search113 
and a statement explaining how the claimed invention differs from 
the found prior art from the search.114 The search and statement of 
relevance would be required in addition to the already required IDS, 
citing any material prior art known by the inventor.115 Other relevant 
application rules and requirements would remain the same. The fees 
associated would be the increased fees set for the enforcer patent, 
111. This comports with the lottery theory of obtaining a patent. See Parchomovsk.y & 
Wagner, supra note 18, at 24-26. If one is playing the lottery, isn't it smarter to buy the 
cheapest potentially winning ticket possible? 
112. Further, the primary patent could always be converted to an enforcer patent upon 
realization that there is commercial viability, including the ability to reach back four years 
to obtain damages. 
113. Standards for acceptable searches would need to be adopted. Recent patent reform 
proposals have discussed the outsourcing of patent searching, a task that is currently per-
formed by patent examiners, and the standards set forth in these proposals may prove ap-
plicable here. See United States Patent and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003: 
Hearing on H.R. 1561 Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, & Intellectual Property of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
judiciary/rogan040303.htm. (statement of James E. Rogan, then-Under Secretary of Com-
merce for Intellectual Property and Director of the Patent Office) (commenting on the 21st 
Century Strategic Plan and noting its proposal to competitively source search functions); 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEF'T OF COMMERCE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC 
PLAN 13 (2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat211 
stratplan_03feb2003.pdf; see also Tamara Loomis, Patents and Trademarks: Opposition to 
Reform Has Scaled Back Overhaul of PTO, 229 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2003). 
114. It may seem that requiring the search and statement from the patentee before 
commencing examination might actually slow the process down; however, it is the patentee 
who is often in the best position to know this information a priori. 
115. For discussion of current IDS practice, see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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and the application would receive a full examination. The term of a 
techno-patent, again reflecting its proposed use for quickly expiring 
technologies, would be six years from the date of filing. 
Although the one-year guaranteed issuance may appear attractive 
to many types of patent applicants and applications, the shortened 
life and the heightened disclosure requirements should serve as a 
substantial deterrent, so that only true ambulance driver applica-
tions would opt for a techno-patent. In fact, the requirement of the 
statement of relevance is probably the greatest deterrent, creating an 
estoppel before the application is even considered by the Patent Of-
fice. Because only a small number of patent applicants would choose 
this route, the techno-patent lane in the multitier patent system 
should not itself become congested, thereby allowing for quick ex-
amination and issuance.116 
Moreover, the abbreviated patent term and search requirement 
serve additional purposes. The requirement that the applicant sub-
mit a search report and a statement explaining how the claimed in-
vention differs from the prior art found in the search furthers the ef-
fort to grant the patent quickly, as this search and determination of 
relevance is among the first tasks performed by the examiner. Also, 
because the patentee is coming to the Patent Office with prior art in 
hand, the shortcomings of the Patent Office in finding prior art-
particularly in these quickly evolving technologies-is alleviated, re-
sulting in potentially better patents. As a safety net for these rapidly 
granted patents, the shortened patent term serves to protect the pub-
lic from a twenty-year monopoly granted on a bad patent, since the 
techno-patent would typically have a five-year life. Even with all of 
the negative aspects, it is assumed that a significant number of ap-
plicants will find this track sufficiently attractive, again decreasing 
the number of applicants seeking enforcer patents and also the con-
gestion in the Patent Office.117 
Because the grant of the techno-patent relies even more heavily 
on the patent applicant to be forthcoming with the Patent Office, it 
may be necessary to reconfigure the standard duty of disclosure as 
associated with these patents. In particular, the current duty of dis-
116. The techno-patent tier could be implemented either through a group of dedicated 
examiners in the likely technology groups for examining only techno-patent applications 
or, conversely, by utilizing the same examiners as working on the enforcer patent applica-
tions. If the regular corps of examiners is used, it will be necessary to implement a process 
that immediately bumps techno-patent applications to the top of any examiner's pile of 
pending applications. 
117. A fair criticism of this proposal is that much of its success rides on applicants 
choosing from the three tracks in the expected numbers. Because of the carrots and sticks 
associated with each of the tracks, it is believed that the patentee will find the expected 
track to be the most attractive and appropriate, thereby allocating the applications as ex-
pected. 
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closure requires only that known prior art that is material to pat-
entability be disclosed with no requirement of a search.118 If a pat-
entee fails to comply with this provision, a court can deem the patent 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct by the applicant before the 
Patent Office.119 Because inequitable conduct is a disfavored 
charge, 120 it currently has a hefty burden of proof attached. In the 
case of techno-patents, the burden of proof should instead be shifted 
downward: the applicant must show full and truthful disclosure to 
maintain an equitable balance. Additionally, it is also possible that 
the presumption of validity associated with granted patents may 
need to be removed for techno-patents.121 
In sum, it is possible to address the particular needs of the various 
contemplated patent application types by implementing a multitiered 
patent system as proposed. Patents which are not intended to be 
used to obtain the classic benefits of patent law and whose validity is 
rarely, if ever, called into question can be granted so that Patent Of-
fice resources are conserved, while still furthering public notice and 
innovation functions. In removing this bulk of patent applications 
from the process, the patent applications remaining in the queue as 
enforcer patents may be examined at a quicker rate and will likely 
receive a more thorough examination because the pressures to issue 
patents quickly will subside with the decreased congestion. As a top 
layer, the implementation of the third tier, particularly directed to 
quickly evolving technology, will allow for quick issuance of patents 
on rapidly obsolescing technologies while placing much of the exami-
nation burden on the applicant, which further permits the grant of 
better patents. 
The three tiers provide a great deal of flexibility for a patent ap-
plicant, who is in the best position to determine the intended use for 
the patent as well as the market realities that surround the subject 
matter. By placing the decision of patent track in the applicant's 
hand, it forces the applicant to make decisions about the patent's 
worth before expending the resources of the Patent Office. Finally, 
although it is believed that the best improvement in quality and 
118. "Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application 
has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the [Patent] Office, which includes a 
duty to disclose to the [Patent] Office all information known to that individual to be mate-
rial to patentability .... " 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2004). 
119. Inequitable conduct, which renders a patent unenforceable, arises when informa-
tion material to patentability is not disclosed to the Patent Office or misinformation is dis-
closed to the Patent Office with an intent to deceive. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. 
Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
120. See Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting 
that "the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every m~or patent case has be-
come an absolute plague"). 
121. A granted patent is presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). 
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speed metrics would result from the implementation of both the pri-
mary patent and techno-patent tiers, the ideas could be implemented 
separately and still yield positive results. 
V. OTHER MULTITIER PATENT SYSTEMS 
Despite the fact that this proposal seems to add complexity to the 
already addled patent system, the notion of multi tier patent systems 
is not new or radical. Not only have a number of foreign countries 
adopted multitiered patent systems, but commentators have also 
suggested such a system in limited circumstances for this country. 
While multitiered patent systems have suffered from some criticism, 
this proposal does not suffer from many of the same infirmities that 
are the subject of that criticism, thereby making this proposal more 
attractive. 
A. International Multitier Patent Systems 
More than sixty countries have some form of multitier, or second 
tier, patent protection.122 While some regimes follow the classic util-
ity model, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, others can be 
considered as modern second tier regimes that vary from the classic 
utility model.l23 The classic utility model, as exemplified by the origi-
nal German Gebrauchsmuster, was essentially a form of design pat-
ent.124 This system featured a "lower standard of inventiveness, no 
pre-grant examination," and a term of protection of three years from 
application, with a possible three-year renewal.125 The Ge-
brauchsmuster system was limited to subject matter of movable arti-
cles having three dimensions, thus excluding processes, circuitry, 
and articles whose appearance were unrelated to their functional-
ity.l2s 
Modern second tier patent regimes are not easily represented by a 
singular example. One second tier patent system is the modern day 
Gebrauchsmuster patent of Germany, altered significantly in 1990 
from its earlier, design patent-based form. 127 Most significantly, the 
spatial form requirement was removed, allowing for patenting of 
122. Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV.INT'LL.J. 151, 153 (1999). 
123. While a brief overview of the two models will be discussed here, see id. for a more 
detailed discussion and comparison of the classic utility model and modern second tier re-
gimes. 
124. See id. at 158-59. 
125. ld. 
126. Id. 
127. FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER ET AL., GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND 
ANTITRUST LAws I/B/201 (1996) (providing an English translation for the German Utility 
Model Act). 
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chemical and electrical inventions.128 The modem Gebrauchsmuster 
requires industrial applicability, novelty, and a less-stringent show-
ing of inventive step.129 A granted Gebrauchsmuster is entitled to a 
maximum ten-year term of protection.130 
Another recent addition to the multitier patent protection forum 
is the Australian Innovation Patent, introduced in 2001 to replace 
the country's petty patent system.131 The Innovation Patent is a tier 
below the standard patent and requires an "innovative step" instead 
of an "inventive step."132 The test is that the difference between the 
claimed invention and the prior art base must make a "substantial 
contribution" to the working of the claimed invention.133 The Innova-
tion Patent is intended to provide protection for lower level or incre-
mental improvements.134 Further, the application process has been 
streamlined, reducing the time and costs associated with obtaining 
patent protection; the grant can be obtained without examination, al-
though infringement proceedings can only be commenced when the 
innovation patent has been certified.135 Moreover, the Innovation 
Patent may be used in conjunction with a standard Australian pat-
ent. The Innovation Patent has an eight-year life.136 
There are also proposals to extend second tier patent grant re-
gimes throughout the world. Most notably, there has been a proposal 
to harmonize existing second tier regimes in the European Union.137 
Second tier patent regimes in Europe have been categorized into four 
types: (1) countries that have moved away from the spatial require-
ment and softened the obviousness requirement, like the German 
128. Janis, supra note 122, at 168-69. 
129. BEIER, supra note 127, at 1/B/201. 
130. Id. at I/B/209. 
131. See generally IP Australia, The Innovation Patent, http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/ 
patents/what_innovation.shtml Oast visited Oct. 7, 2004). 
132. Anne Duffy, Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000, 23 EUR. lNTELL. 
PROP. REV. N-38 (2001). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at N-37. 
135. I d. at N -37 to N -38. 
136. Id. at N-37. 
137. See Janis, supra note 122, at n.20; see also Proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inven-
tions by Utility Model, 1998 O.J. (C 36) 13; Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the 'Proposal for an European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Le-
gal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model,' 1998 O.J. (C 235) 26 
[hereinafter July 1998 Opinion]. These build on The Commission Green Paper on the Pro-
tection of Utility Models in the Single Market, COM (1995) 370 final (July 19, 1995), and 
the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Green Paper: The Protection of 
Utility Models in the Single Market,' 1996 O.J. (C 174) 6 [hereinafter June 1996 Opinion]. 
While most of the current EU member states already have some form of second tier protec-
tion, the U.K, Sweden, and Luxembourg currently do not. Proposal for a European Parli-
ment and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of In-
ventions by Utility Model, at 7, COM (1997) 691 final (Dec. 12, 1997). 
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Gebrauchsmuster; (2) countries that have removed the spatial re-
quirement but leave in place the traditional obviousness/inventive 
step criterion; (3) countries maintaining a classic utility model re-
gime; and (4) countries, such as the United Kingdom, that offer no 
second tier patent protection.138 The European Commission, seeking 
to harmonize this vast range of second tier patent protections avail-
able, set forth a proposed harmonized utility model patent featuring 
a shortened life of six years with the potential for two, two-year re-
newals; a limited number of claims; and lack of pregrant examina-
tion.139 The proposal removes the spatial limitation but adds a two-
track, inventive-step standard, wherein the subject matter with-
stands scrutiny if it exhibits either a particular effectiveness in terms 
of ease of use or a practical or industrial advantage.140 
B. Multitier Patent Systems in the United States 
Multitier patent systems are not only an intemational concem. At 
the highest level, the United States is already, in some respects, a 
multitier patent system. Although utility patents are the most com-
mon and are the subject of the reform proposed in this Article, the 
United States also offers design patents and plant patents.141 Each of 
these patent types are govemed by separate rules for examination 
and enforcement and are strictly limited to the subject matter falling 
within each patent's scope. In a similar vein, commentators have 
proposed additional second tier patent protection for subject matter 
falling within other technological scopes, such as for environmental 
inventions142 and computer software.143 Professors Jaffe and Lemer 
also posit the benefits of a technology-specific multitier patent sys-
tem, before dismissing the idea as being rife with potential for cor-
ruption as inventors jockey to ensure that their invention is catego-
rized to receive the most favorable patent treatment.144 
138. Janis, supra note 122, at 168. 
139. Id. at 168-69. 
140. Id. at 169-70. 
141. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000) (authorizing a patent for an inventor who "invents any 
new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture"); id. § 161 (authorizing 
a patent for an inventor who "invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct 
and new variety of plant"). 
142. Natalie M. Derzlm, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to 
Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REv. 3, 14 (1996) (proposing an "environmental patent" that eliminates the nonobviousness 
requirement for product and process inventions related to environmental technologies but 
grants only a ten-year term of protection). 
143. See, e.g., Mark Aaron Paley, A Model Software Petite Patent Act, 12 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 301 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concern-
ing the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, (1994); Richard 
H. Stem, A Sui Generis Utility Model Law as an Alternative Legal Model for Protecting 
Software, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 108 (1993). 
144. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 203-05. 
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Multitier patent proposals are not limited to specific subject mat-
ter limitations. Professor Bartow has suggested adding a general tier 
to the United States patent system, not unlike the Australian Inno-
vation Patent, called an "Origination Patent."145 The proposed Origi-
nation Patent would include streamlined prosecution and would is-
sue within one year.146 The life of the Origination Patent would be 
three to five years.147 While the examination process of the Origina-
tion Patent would be based on all of the traditional patentability 
standards, that is, patentable subject matter, novelty, and nonobvi-
ousness, an Origination Patent would not be subject to invalidity 
challenges based on utility or obviousness in litigation.148 
C. In Defense of a Multitier Patent System 
The fact that proposals for second tier protection are being intro-
duced in this country and that second tier patent systems are flour-
ishing abroad lends credibility to the system proposed in this Article. 
Simply put, this system can be implemented. Specifically, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs Agreement),149 while establishing minimum substantive 
standards for patent laws, fails to discuss second tier protection and 
leaves member countries free to establish multitier patent systems 
as they see fit. Further, the Paris Convention150 includes second tier 
patents among other defined categories of industrial property.151 This 
inclusion extends national treatment and priority to second tier pat-
ents but establishes no other benchmarks.152 Further, the proposed 
system is carefully designed to make it the applicant's option which 
tier to travel, thus avoiding de facto discrimination by technology 
area or applicant. 153 
Despite the widespread usage of multi tier patent systems in other 
countries, at least one commentator has denounced the introduction 
of such a system in the United States.154 Professor Mark Janis exam-
ines these second tier patent systems, characterized by "relatively 




149. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
150. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last 
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
151. Id. at art. 1(2); see also id. at art. 1(4) ("Patents shall include the various kinds of 
industrial patents recognized by the laws of the countries of the Union, such as patents of 
importation, patents of improvement, patents and certificates of addition, etc."). 
152. Id. at arts. 2(1) & 4(A)(l). 
153. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 149, at art. 27 (prohibiting discrimination on 
patenting by technology type). 
154. See Janis, supra note 122, at 154. 
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short-term protection, protectability standards that may be less rig-
orous than those applicable to regular patents, and the granting of 
rights without any prior examination for compliance with substan-
tive protectability standards."155 He reaches the conclusion that sec-
ond tier patent protection fails to live up to its rationale of improving 
access to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).156 Professor Janis 
also indicates that second tier patent protection further fails to suffi-
ciently address rationales of providing quick protection to inventions 
having short life cycles and access for nontraditional subject mat-
ter.157 Granted, the focus of Professor Janis's criticism is interna-
tional second tier patent regimes and the consequences these regimes 
may have on global harmonization of patent law. As such, his criti-
cisms are based on a working assumption that any second tier patent 
protection scheme would be directed at subpatentable inventions, or 
those that do not qualify under the United States' already low 
threshold of obviousness and inventiveness.158 
The multitier patent system proposed in this Article does not suf-
fer from the shortfalls raised by Professor Janis. As an initial matter, 
the system is not designed to increase access to SMEs or anyone, nor 
is it directed to subpatentable inventions; rather, the lowest thresh-
old point, the primary patent, is subject to the same costs and re-
quirements as the current United States patent.159 Professor Janis 
contends that the quick access required for rapidly obsolescing tech-
nologies can be found either through petitions to make special or 
through provisional practice.160 However, as analyzed above, it is 
clear that neither of those mechanisms is sufficient. The system pro-
posed in this Article does address the special needs of patents having 
a short life cycle head-on. Further, Professor Janis's criticisms do not 
take into account the notion that there may be different types of pat-
ent applications having different needs. For all of these reasons, the 
criticisms proffered by Professor Janis are inapplicable to the mul-
titiered patent system proposed here. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the patent grant system, as it is today, is congested 
and overcrowded. This overcrowding results in not only delayed pat-
155. Id. at 152. 
156. See id. at 178-88. 
157. See id. at 188-94. 
158. See generally id. 
159. Certainly, there is some argument that the lack of examination of primary patents 
would increase access to subpatentable inventions. However, this is countered by the fact 
that the uses available for primary patents are ones where validity is not typically ques-
tioned. 
160. See Janis, supra note 122, at 190-91. 
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ent grants but also the pressure to grant patents quickly, raising the 
potential for bad patents. Certainly some of the overcrowding is at-
tributable to the fact that the current patent grant system simply 
fails to account for inventors seeking patent protection for benefits 
beyond those understood under the traditional theory of patent law. 
Patents obtained for nontraditional uses may not require the same 
level of scrutiny as patents obtained for the purpose of litigating or 
licensing for money. Further, some patents are sought in quickly 
evolving technology areas and may require expedited treatment to 
give the inventor a fair retum on his patent. In these technology ar-
eas, the Patent Office often does not have access to the best prior art, 
resulting in a greater number of bad patents. A multitiered patent 
system, addressing specially the needs of both inventors seeking pat-
ents for nontraditional uses and inventors of rapidly obsolescing 
technologies, coupled with the traditional patent system, would give 
inventors flexibility in choosing a patent that best suits their needs 
while decreasing the congestion in the Patent Office. In the end, such 
a system would result in better patents being issued more quickly. 
